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Abstract
A significant proportion of firms that reorganize under Chapter 11 file for a second
Chapter 11 protection or liquidate. We use a Asplit-populationB duration model that
provides useful information regarding factors that could lead to a second bankruptcy. We
find that the probability Žhazard. of a firm re-entering bankruptcy is lower for firms that
take a long time to reorganize, reduce their debt-to-assets ratio, do not divest, belong to an
industry that has low capacity utilization and low demand growth. We also find that the
probability of an average firm re-entering bankruptcy increases for about 4 years before
declining.
JEL classification: C41; G33
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1. Introduction
Since the modification of the bankruptcy laws in 1978 the provision under
Chapter 11, where financially distressed firms can seek the protection of the court
from its creditors, has been under close scrutiny. Some observers argue that
reorganization of a firm under Chapter 11 may not have been successful if it
subsequently files for another bankruptcy. Hotchkiss Ž1995. reports that almost
40% of the firms in her sample continue to experience operating losses in the 2

years following emergence from Chapter 11 protection and 15% of the firms
re-enter Chapter 11 a second time. LoPucki and Whitford Ž1993. and Gilson
Ž1996. also find a large incidence of firms filing for bankruptcy or restructuring
their debt a second time.
However, in the presence of liquidation costs ŽShleifer and Vishny, 1992. and
agency costs ŽMooradian, 1994., a reorganization under Chapter 11 can be
successful even if the firm files for a second Chapter 11 protection, as long as the
cash flows to the firm’s claimants exceed what they would have been in
liquidation. Despite the argument that a second bankruptcy is not necessarily a
failure, whether a firm re-enters bankruptcy remains an important issue to policy
makers who monitor the bankruptcy process and also to the creditors and the
stockholders of reorganized firms.
In this paper, we address the following issues: How long does it take before a
firm that has been reorganized under Chapter 11 files for a second Chapter 11
protection or liquidate Žhenceforth referred to as Athe firm re-entering
bankruptcyB .? What is the probability that an average firm will never file for
another bankruptcy? Is the relative vulnerability to another bankruptcy influenced
by firm-specific differences or by changes in industry and economy-wide conditions? In order to address these issues, we observe firms that file for Chapter 11
and subsequently emerge as reorganized firms between 1979 and 1990. We track
these firms until 1993 to determine if they re-enter bankruptcy. The variable of
interest is the time to the second bankruptcy filing, which enables us to analyze the
vulnerability of a firm over time. We examine how the characteristics of the firm
and the general business environment in which the firm operates affect this
variable. Some firms in the sample have not re-entered bankruptcy by the end of
1993. These firms might re-enter bankruptcy after 1993 Žgiving rise to censored
observations. or might continue to operate without ever re-entering bankruptcy. A
split-population duration model Žsee Schmidt and Witte, 1989. is used in the
estimation. The duration model incorporates censoring to estimate the instantaneous probability Žhazard. of a reorganized firm re-entering bankruptcy. The
AsplitB parameter is included to control for the fact that some firms may never go
bankrupt once they have emerged from Chapter 11.
The hazard is specified as a function of firm specific characteristics, industry
and economy-wide factors. This hazard is also influenced by the time elapsed after
emergence from Chapter 11. A lower hazard at a point in time implies a smaller
instantaneous probability of re-entering bankruptcy. We find that firms with a
lower hazard: Ža. have spent a longer period of time under their first reorganization, Žb. have had a larger reduction in their debt-to-assets ratio during reorganization, Žc. have experienced a smaller decrease in their lines of businesses during
reorganization, Žd. are part of an industry that had a lower capacity utilization at
the time of emergence, and Že. belong to a low demand growth industry. We also
find that the estimated hazard of an average firm goes up for about 4 years before
it begins to decline. This result suggests that a firm that emerged, say, 4 years ago

is more likely to encounter another bankruptcy as compared to a firm that emerged
2 years ago. These results are conditional on the fact that some firms may never
eventually re-enter bankruptcy. For an average firm probability of eventually
re-entering bankruptcy is approximately 73%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the dependent and
the independent variables are described. The methodology used is discussed in
Section 3. Results and interpretation appear in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Description of the variables
2.1. The dependent Õariable
A list of firms that filed for protection under Chapter 11 between 1979 and
1990 is obtained from the annual reports of the Securities and Exchange Commission ŽSEC.. This document and the Corporate Changes Reporter ŽCCR. are used
to determine which of these firms are reorganized. The filing and the emergence
years are denoted by t f and te , respectively. After a firm has emerged from
Chapter 11 protection it is tracked until 1993, the year that is chosen for the end of
our study.1 A record of whether or not during this period the firm either re-enters
Chapter 11 protection or files for liquidation under Chapter 7 is made. The exact
filing and emergence dates of the first reorganization and the date of re-entry into
a second bankruptcy are obtained from the CCR, the Directory of Obsolete
Securities ŽDOS., the Wall Street Journal Index ŽWSJI. and the Bankruptcy
Almanac ŽBA.. If no information on the firm re-entering bankruptcy from te until
1993 is obtained in the above publications, it is assumed that the firm continues to
operate. To verify that the firm is indeed operating, the Standard and Poor’s
Register of Corporations, Directors and ExecutiÕes and the Compustat database
are used. This is done to ensure that just because the CCR, DOS, WSJI or the BA
does not report a re-entry into bankruptcy, it is not erroneously assumed that the
firm continues to operate.2
1
Ten firms from our original data set are deleted from the sample because they are merged or
acquired as a part of the reorganization plan. This is necessary since it is not possible to track merged
or acquired firms to determine if they re-enter bankruptcy. For example, Evans Products Žwhich filed
for protection on March 12, 1985 and emerged on July 2, 1986. merged with Grossman’s as a part of
the reorganization plan. It is not possible to determine if Evans Products re-enters bankruptcy since
only Grossman’s can be tracked after July 2, 1986. However, there are a few instances when the firm
continues to operate as a separate entity even after the merger. For example, HRT Industries. Žwhich
filed for protection on November 23, 1982 and emerged on February 10, 1984. merged into a
subsidiary of McCrory, effective April 19, 1985. We are able to track HRT Industries since it continued
to operate as a separate entity. Few firms merge after a significantly long time after emergence and are
treated as censored observations.
2
For example, Altec Žwhich filed for protection on September 26, 1983 and emerged on May 21,
1987. is dropped from the sample because no additional information regarding this firm is available
after 1988 from any of the above-mentioned publications and the Compustat database. We drop 23
firms for this reason.

Fig. 1. The sequence of events after the firm’s first Chapter 11 filing. tf is the date the firm files for
Chapter 11 protection; te is the date the firm emerges from Chapter 11 protection; All emerged firms
Ž107. are tracked until the end of 1993. Forty-two firms re-enter bankruptcy and 65 continue to operate;
The dependent variable is Ž tc y te . for firms that re-enter bankruptcy Žcompleted observation. and
Ž t 93 y te . for firms that continue to operate until 1993 Žcensored observation.; Ž te y t f . is the time taken
to reorganize the first time and is used as an independent variable.

The dependent variable is the time Žduration. between the firm’s emergence
from Chapter 11 and the firm’s re-entry into bankruptcy. This variable enables us
to analyze the vulnerability of firms over time. The sequence of events after a firm
files for its first Chapter 11 protection is described in Fig. 1 where the dependent
variable is Ž t c y te . for completed observations and Ž t 93 y te . for censored observations. Data are available for 107 firms, of which 42 firms re-enter bankruptcy.3
Note that the recidivism in our sample is larger than in a related study by
Hotchkiss Ž1995.. She tracks reorganized firms for 3 years and firms that have not
re-entered bankruptcy by that time are implicitly treated as ones that will never do
so. We find that 57% of the firms in our sample that re-enter bankruptcy do so
after 3 years.
A firm that does not re-enter bankruptcy results in a censored observation since
we do not when, and indeed if, such a firm will file for bankruptcy. Thus, the
sample consists of completed and censored durations. The frequency distribution
of firms re-entering bankruptcy is presented in Fig. 2. These firms are associated
with completed observations since the exact duration of time to bankruptcy on
only these firms is known. For the firms that re-file for bankruptcy, it takes an
average time of 3.6 years. A large proportion of firms re-entering bankruptcy do
so within 6 years of their re- organization, with only four firms taking more than 6
years.
2.2. The independent Õariables
The following independent variables represent the postulated firm specific,
industry and economy-wide factors that contribute to the future success of a
reorganized firm.

3

Seventeen firms are dropped from the sample because firm specific variables are not available
from: Ža. Compustat, Žb. Disclosure Žc. Moody’s Manuals Žd. the firm’s annual 10K filings with the
SEC.

Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of firms that re-enter bankruptcy.

2.2.1. The time the firm spends under Chapter 11 (Duration 1)
This is defined as the period between t f and te , the time the firm spends under
Chapter 11 protection while it reorganizes. There are several reasons for the
inclusion of Duration 1 as a control variable. Many authors Žsee, e.g., Jensen,
1989; Gilson et al., 1990. point out that the primary disadvantage of reorganization under Chapter 11 is its relative cost. Both direct costs Žfees to accountants and
lawyers. and indirect costs Žlost sales or profits due to the constraints imposed by
the trustee. of Chapter 11 filing depend on the length of a firm’s stay under
Chapter 11 protection. A higher cost of reorganization could enhance the possibility of future financial difficulties. On the contrary, a longer time in Chapter 11
may provide the firm with sufficient protection needed to reorganize successfully
Žsee Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998.. For these reasons the effect of Duration 1 on
the failure probability is ambiguous, a priori.
2.2.2. Assets of the firm when it emerges from its first Chapter 11 protection (Log
Assets)
This variable, measured by the natural log of total assets at the time the firm
emerges from Chapter 11, is included to control for firm size. In general, large
firms have greater ability to raise additional funds in the capital market ŽWhite,
1984; Casey et al., 1986.. It is expected that the larger the firm the lower is the
probability of the firm re-entering bankruptcy.

2.2.3. The change in the leÕerage of the firm during reorganization (Change in
Debt r Assets)
This variable, measured by the difference between the debt-to-assets ratio of the
firm at the time it emerges from the time it files for Chapter 11, is included to
capture the ability of the firm to lower its indebtedness. A firm in financial distress
is likely to have a high debt-to-assets ratio. Opler and Titman Ž1994. show that
high debt adversely affects operating performance since in an industry downturn,
high debt firms lose more sales than firms with low debt. It is important to note
that high debt ratios may actually be the optimal capital structure for a reorganized
firm. For instance, Harris and Raviv Ž1990. and Hart and Moore Ž1995. show that
high levels of debt curbs the managers’ ability to make unprofitable but empirebuilding investments, and to trigger liquidation if the firms’ assets become more
valuable elsewhere. However, it is postulated that a higher debt-to-assets ratio,
irrespective of its optimality, contributes to a greater risk of the firm encountering
another bankruptcy.4
2.2.4. The change in the CEO while the firm undergoes reorganization (Change in
CEO)
Some observers contend that the Chapter 11 process is inefficient, in part,
because of the provision of the bankruptcy code that allows incumbent management to retain control of the firm in bankruptcy and propose a reorganization plan.
It is alleged that managers acting on the behalf of the shareholders ŽBebchuk and
Chang, 1992. and in their own self-interest ŽBoot, 1992. are biased towards the
continuation of an insolvent firm. Jensen Ž1993. adds that when managers shut
plants or liquidate firms, this process A . . . causes personal pain, creates uncertainty
and interrupts or sidetracks careers. Rather than confronting this pain, managers
generally resist such action as long as they have cash flow to subsidize the losing
operations.B The CEO change variable is included to examine if a change in
management Žor lack thereof. has an impact on the future success of the firm. If
the incumbent management does indeed bias the Chapter 11 process towards the
continuation of inefficient firms, then firms that appoint a new CEO during
reorganization should have a lower probability of re-entering bankruptcy.
2.2.5. The change in the number of lines of businesses during reorganization
(Change in aSIC)
It is argued that firms that are more diversified at the time of the Chapter 11
filing are more successful after emergence, since they have the capability to
operate after divesting unsuccessful lines of businesses. The immediate benefit of
4

In fact, our raw data suggest that of the 20 firms with the highest value of Change in DebtrAssets,
11 re-entered bankruptcy by 1993. By comparison, only six firms out of the 20 with the lowest value
re-enter bankruptcy.

divesting is an increase in liquidity and a return to core lines of businesses.
However, since the market for assets of a bankrupt firm is generally thin, it is
easier for firms to sell only those assets that are in relatively high demand.
Maksimovic and Phillips Ž1998. find that bankrupt firms that sell and close plants
over time are associated with a decrease in overall firm performance. The Change
in aSIC variable, measured by the change in the number of 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classification ŽSIC. codes listed for the firm during reorganization, is
included to control for these factors. The impact of this variable on the likelihood
of future success of the firm is ambiguous.
2.2.6. Industry capacity utilization when the firm emerges from Chapter 11
(Capacity Utilization)
Often, firm performance is dictated by industry-wide conditions. Lang and
Stulz Ž1992. find that the performance of a firm is affected by Chapter 11 filings
by other firms in the industry. Shleifer and Vishny Ž1992. argue that the market
for a firm’s assets will be illiquid when other firms in the same industry are also
distressed. John et al. Ž1992. find that distressed firms often cite exogenous,
industry shocks as causes for their decline. The Capacity Utilization variable is
included to control for these factors. However, a comparison of good vs. bad
industry conditions cannot be made accurately based solely on the capacity
utilization rate since capacity utilization generally differs across industries at all
times. Therefore, we define a variable that represents the capacity utilization of the
industry in the year the firm emerges from Chapter 11, deflated by the industry
peak capacity utilization in the previous business cycle.5 The operating performance of the firm’s industry relative to peak performance has two counteracting
forces on the hazard of a firm re-entering bankruptcy. A healthy industry implies
that a firm in that industry has a better chance of survival as compared to a similar
firm in a poorly performing industry. However, a high capacity utilization might
be the reason that the bankrupt firm was able to emerge from Chapter 11
protection, although inherently the firm was not financially viable. Thus, this
variable has an ambiguous impact on the firm’s probability of another bankruptcy.
2.2.7. Industry growth oÕer a 10-year period (Demand Growth)
This is another variable that controls for industry-specific differences. It
measures the long-term growth prospects of an industry.6 Unlike, the capacity
utilization variable that is computed at the emergence year, the demand growth
variable is computed for a fixed period between 1982 and 1992. This allows
demand growth to be more industry specific as compared to the capacity utilization variable that may also be influenced by idiosyncratic economy-wide condi5

For our sample period, the monthly highs for the previous business cycle occurred in 1988–1989.
Maksimovic and Phillips Ž1998. point out that this variable also captures cost shifts from increased
foreign imports or shocks to production costs, as well as demand changes in the industry.
6

tions in the year the firm emerges from Chapter 11. Maksimovic and Phillips
Ž1998. show that the average productivity of firms that become bankrupt, plant
closures and asset sales during bankruptcy, and the optimal resolution of bankruptcy
depend on the level of industry demand. A higher proportion of firms that file for
bankruptcy are from low demand growth industries. However, while bankrupt
firms in low demand growth industries do not have significantly lower productivity than their industry counterparts, those in high demand growth industries are
under-performers. Given these findings it is postulated that the higher the industry
demand growth the greater is the probability of re-entering bankruptcy.
2.2.8. The rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the time
the firm emerges from Chapter 11 (GDP Growth)
This variable, measured by the 3-year average GDP growth after the firm
emerges from Chapter 11, is included to control for economy-wide factors that
affect the general environment in which the firm is operating. A priori, the effect
of the GDP Growth variable on the hazard is similar to the impact of the Capacity
Utilization variable. A relatively healthy economy at the time of the emergence of
the firm from Chapter 11 may result in a better chance of survival as compared to
a similar firm that emerges from protection at a time when the economy is
performing relatively poorly. However, a high GDP growth might have assisted
the firm to emerge from Chapter 11 protection, although the firm was not
sufficiently healthy. Thus, this variable also has an ambiguous impact on the
firm’s probability of another bankruptcy.
The actual filing and emergence dates used to compute Duration 1 are obtained
from CCR, DOS, WSJI and BA. The total assets of the firm at te are used to
compute Log Assets. The long-term debtrtotal assets ratio of the firm is obtained
for te and t f and the difference is used to calculate Change in DebtrAssets. Data
on Log Assets and Change in DebtrAssets are obtained from Compustat, Disclosure, Moody’s Manuals and 10K filings of the firm with the SEC.
The Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and ExecutiÕes is
used to collect data on the Change in CEO and the Change in aSIC variables. For
each firm the names of the CEO as well as the number of 4-digit SIC categories
listed are obtained for t f and te . By comparing the names, the Change in CEO
variable is constructed. If over time this position is created or dropped then it is
recorded as a change. The Change in aSIC is constructed by taking the difference
between the number of SIC listings at te and t f . To obtain the Capacity Utilization
variable, we first classify firms according to their SIC code at the time of
emergence. The capacity utilization corresponding to the firm’s industry for the
year it emerged from protection, and the peak industry capacity utilization for the
previous business cycle are obtained from the Federal ReserÕe Bulletin. The
demand growth variable is also constructed on the basis of SIC codes. For each
firm, its industry growth rate between 1982 and 1992 of the value of product
shipments is computed. The value of product shipments is available for the

Table 1
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variables

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

Difference
in means )

Duration 1
Log Assets
Change in DebtrAssets
Change in CEO
Change in aSIC
Capacity Utilization
Demand Growth
GDP Growth

1.973
3.748
0.079
0.505
y0.551
94.25
0.707
2.455

1.728
3.719
0.012
1.000
0.000
95.16
0.676
2.642

1.257
2.289
0.337
0.502
3.286
4.793
0.845
1.205

0.597 a
y0.867 a
0.113 a
y0.086
0.163
y0.432
0.170
0.125

Ø Duration 1: the number of years that the firm spends under Chapter 11.
Ø Log Assets: natural log of assets, in millions of US$, of the firm at emergence.
Ø Change in DebtrAssets: the change in the debt-to-assets ratio during reorganization.
Ø Change in CEO: 1 if CEO changes during reorganization; 0 otherwise.
Ø Change in aSIC: the change in the number of 4-digit SIC listings during reorganization.
Ø Capacity Utilization: the capacity utilization of the industry of the firm at emergence.
Ø Demand Growth: the industry growth rate of the firm between 1982 and 1992.
Ø GDP Growth: the average GDP growth rate of 3 years after the emergence.
a
Denote significance at 5%.
)
Represents the difference in means between the firms that re-enter bankruptcy and the ones that
continue to operate at the end of 1993.

manufacturing industries. For other industries, similar measures are used to
calculate demand growth. For example, the value of construction work is used to
compute the demand growth for the construction industries. The data are obtained
from various publications of the Census Bureau. The GDP is obtained from the
International Financial Statistics database. Three-year moving averages for GDP
growth are created using the series.
Descriptive statistics on the independent variables appear in Table 1. The mean,
the median and the standard deviation are reported in the first three columns using
all the firms in the sample. The last column reports the difference in means of the
variables between the firms that re-enter bankruptcy and the ones that continue to
operate at the end of 1993. We find that the means are significantly different at 5%
for the Duration 1, the Log Assets, and the Change in DebtrAssets variables. The
averages of all the firms in the sample indicate that the average firm:
Ža. spends almost 2 years in its first reorganization,
Žb. at the time of emergence has total assets of US$509 million with a high
standard deviation of US$2,660 million. The median assets are US$41 million.7
7
The natural log of total assets is used as an independent variable to control for a high variability
and skewness of total assets. Results do not change qualitatively when total assets is used instead.

Žc. emerges as a firm with a slightly higher debt-to-assets ratio,
Žd. has a 50.5% chance of a change in CEO while it reorganizes,
Že. undergoes a reduction in the number of lines of businesses it owns while it
reorganizes,
Žf. is part of an industry that has a capacity utilization relative to peak capacity
of 94.25% in the firm’s emergence year,
Žg. is part of an industry that has a 10-year demand growth of 70.7%,
Žh. operates in an environment where the average GDP growth 3 years after
emergence from reorganization is 2.45%.
The 107 firms are distributed across 83 different 4-digit SIC categories. The
largest concentration is in the Aeating placesB and Avariety storesB industries with
six and four firms, respectively. Overall, there are 15 industries that have two or
more firms.

3. The methodology
Since the dependent variable is a duration, the appropriate estimation methodology is duration Žalternatively known as hazard rate. models. As is customary in
applications of duration models, it is the hazard rate that is analyzed. The hazard
rate is the instantaneous probability of an agent making a transition from one state
to another, given that the transition has not already occurred. In the context of this
paper, the hazard is the instantaneous probability that a firm that has emerged from
Chapter 11 protection moves from a solvent to a bankrupt state.
An implicit assumption made in most survival time models is that of certain
exit, which in this context implies that all reorganized firms will eventually go
bankrupt. We use a split-population duration model Žsee Schmidt and Witte, 1989.
that takes into account the possibility that the transition from one state to another
may neÕer occur. This adjustment is appropriate since the firm that has emerged
from Chapter 11 once may never re-enter bankruptcy. Thus, the probability that a
firm will eventually fail is postulated to be less than one. The model estimates the
instantaneous probability of failure Žhazard. at a point in time along with the
probability of eventual failure.
Duration models are represented in terms of the density, survivor, and hazard
functions, denoted by f Ž t ; X ., SŽ t ; X ., and hŽ t ; X ., respectively. The duration
variable is T which denotes the length of time that a reorganized firm takes to
re-enter bankruptcy. These functions are conditional on the independent variables,
X.8 The likelihood function consists of f Ž t ; X . for completed durations and
8
See Kiefer Ž1988., Jaggia and Thosar Ž1995. and Baek and Bandopadhyaya Ž1996. for a
description and applications of standard duration model and Gucht and Moore Ž1998. for a split-population model.

SŽ t ; X . for censored observations. The survivor function captures the fact that the
duration of the observation is at least as long as implied by the censoring point.
Let C be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the duration is complete and 0 if it
is censored. The duration is complete for firms that re-enter bankruptcy, and
censored for those firms that do not, during the observation period. The standard
duration model assumes that censored firms will eventually re-enter bankruptcy.
The split-population duration model allows the possibility that some censored
firms may never re-enter bankruptcy. Let U be an unobservable variable that
equals 1 if the firm eventually fails and 0 otherwise. Then,
P Ž U s 1. s d ,

P Ž U s 0. s 1 y d .

Ž 1.

Here, d is the Asplit-population parameterB that denotes the probability of
eventual failure. If d - 1, then a proportion of the censored firms will never
re-enter bankruptcy. For a firm that has re-entered bankruptcy, we have T s t and
C s 1. The appropriate density for such a firm is therefore,
P Ž U s 1 . f Ž t ; X ,U s 1 . s d f Ž t ; X ,U s 1 . .

Ž 2.

For a censored observation Ž C s 0., all we know is that the firm has not re-entered
bankruptcy during the observation period. We entertain two possibilities, Ža. that
the firm would have re-entered if it were followed longer and Žb. that this firm
would never re-enter bankruptcy. Specifically,
P Ž C s 0 . s P Ž U s 0 . q P Ž U s 1 . P Ž T ) t ; X ,U s 1 .
s 1 y d q d S Ž t ; X ,U s 1 . .

Ž 3.

The likelihood function consists of expressions Ž2. and Ž3. above for completed
and censored durations, respectively. This likelihood function can be constructed
once the hazard function is parameterized. In this paper, we use a log-logistic
hazard function that has a property that it declines for sufficiently large T. This
function is appropriate since, for a reorganized firm that has operated successfully
for a reasonably long period of time, the probability of re-entering bankruptcy is
expected to decline. The log-logistic hazard function is given by:
h Ž t ; X ,U s 1 . s exp Ž X b . a t ay1 Ž 1 q exp Ž X b . t a .

y1

.

Ž 4.

X b s b 0 q b 1 X 1 q b 2 X 2 q . . . qb k X k and the X j ’s are the firm-specific, industry and economy-wide variables and a is the shape parameter of the hazard. It is
useful to note that if a variable has a positive impact on the hazard, then it has a
negative impact on the duration to second bankruptcy. The log-likelihood function
for a split-population model that uses Ž4. to compute Ž2. and Ž3. above is:
N

ln L s Ý C ln d q ln a q w y 2ln Ž 1 q exp Ž w . .
is1

q Ž 1 y C . ln Ž 1 y d q d Ž 1 q exp Ž w . .

y1

.

Ž 5.

where w s X b q a ln t and the X ’s are all the independent variables discussed in
Section 2.2. The split parameter d allows the probability of eventual failure to be
different from one and if the estimated d is not significantly different from 1, the
split model is converges to a standard hazard model.9 The parameter estimates are
obtained by maximizing the above log-likelihood function.10

4. Results and interpretation
In our model we estimate the probability of a second bankruptcy given the firm
specific and other factors at the time the firm emerges from its first bankruptcy,
and the time path of this probability. Parameter estimates from the split log-logistic model appear in Table 2. We also include in this table the estimates from the
standard log-logistic model for comparison. Although the results of the two
models are similar in terms of the sign and significance of the variables, the split
parameter model is more appropriate. We find that the estimate of the split
parameter is 0.727 and is significantly different from one at any level of
significance. The estimate implies that an average reorganized firm faces only a
73% probability of another bankruptcy. For an individual firm, cross-sectional
differences are captured by the hazard function. At any given point after reorganization, the hazard will differ between firms. Further, the hazard varies over time.
We begin with a discussion of the impact of the characteristics of the firm and
the general business environment in which the firm operates on the instantaneous
probability of the firm re-entering bankruptcy.11 The time the firm spends under
Chapter 11 the first time ŽDuration 1. has a significant, negative influence on the
hazard. This implies that the longer a firm spends under its first reorganization, the
lower is the hazard of a subsequent bankruptcy. A longer reorganization process is
often perceived as inefficient, because it imposes higher bankruptcy costs. However, as documented by Maksimovic and Phillips Ž1998., a relatively longer
protection period enables many firms in bankruptcy to enhance their level of
productivity, which makes the costs related to bankruptcy worthwhile to incur.
9
It should be mentioned that d can also be a function of the X variables that are used in the hazard.
However, as pointed out by a referee, since economic theory provides no direction, it is difficult to
identify the influence of the same variable on both the hazard and the probability of eventual failure.
10
Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained using the MAXLIK module of the GAUSS programming language. Consistent estimate of the variance–covariance matrix of the parameters is derived as
Hy1 Ž G T G . Hy1 where H and G denote the Hessian and the gradient evaluated at the maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters.
11
Although we discuss the sign and significance of the hazard parameters Ž b ., it should be pointed
out that the magnitude of the influence of the factors also depends on the estimated value of d .
Therefore, the marginal contribution of a factor on the probability of a second bankruptcy depends on
the estimated eventual failure probability of 0.727.

Table 2
Estimates of log-logistic and split-population log-logistic models
Variables

Log-logistic model

Split-population
log-logistic model

Constant Ž b 0 .
Duration 1 Ž b 1 .
Log Assets Ž b 2 .
Change in DebtrAssets Ž b 3 .
Change in CEO Ž b4 .
Change in aSIC Ž b5 .
Capacity Utilization Ž b6 .
Demand Growth Ž b 7 .
GDP Growth Ž b 8 .
a
d

y11.11b Žy1.597.
y0.482 a Žy3.118.
y0.158 b Žy1.302.
1.671a Ž3.002.
0.154 Ž0.326.
y0.073 Žy1.091.
0.087 Ž1.204.
0.275 b Ž1.374.
0.218 Ž0.843.
1.734 a, ) Ž3.656.

y18.10 a Žy2.196.
y0.657 a Žy3.487.
y0.175 Žy1.206.
1.542 a Ž2.709.
0.372 Ž0.549.
y0.541a Žy3.463.
0.162 a Ž1.894.
0.398 b Ž1.391.
0.160 Ž0.451.
2.210 a, ) Ž4.227.
0.727 a, ) Ž2.638.

The t-statistics are presented in the parentheses.
Ø The coefficients b ’s capture the influence of the regressors on the hazard.
Ø The shape parameter a determines the point after which the hazard declines.
Ø The split parameter d represents the probability of eventual failure.
a
Denote significance at 5%.
b
Denote significance at 10%.
)
For a and d , the t-statistic is evaluated at 1.

The change in the debt-to-assets ratio variable is significant with a positive
coefficient. The higher the debt-to-assets ratio at the time of emergence relative to
the ratio at the time of filing the greater is the hazard. This result is of significant
importance since we find that the average firm in our sample emerges with a
higher debt-to-assets ratio as compared to when it files for protection. Gilson
Ž1996. also reports an increase in leverage during reorganization and reports a
higher incidence of recurring bankruptcy for firms that remain more leveraged
after restructuring their debt. Our result is consistent with the argument that firms
that emerge from bankruptcy with relatively high debt ratios are adversely affected
by the leverage ŽOpler and Titman, 1994. and are ones that have poor growth
opportunities ŽAlderson and Betker, 1995.. As argued before, a relatively high
debtrasset ratio may be optimal for the firm, an argument that is not contradictory
to our finding. Firms that emerge with high debt ratios that are optimal are ones
whose monitors have determined that the high leverage is necessary to impose
discipline on the managers and use it as a means to trigger liquidation if necessary.
Perhaps, high leverage can be interpreted as a signal that the firm is more likely to
encounter another bankruptcy because its growth opportunities are likely to be
limited andror the stakeholders have perceived that liquidation is a possibility.
The change during reorganization of the number of SIC codes listed for the
firm has a negative impact on the hazard. The more the number of lines of
businesses that the firm has, at the time it emerges relative to when it filed for
protection, the lower is the hazard. The average firm in our sample emerges with a

smaller number of lines of businesses. This is consistent with the finding in John
et al. Ž1992. that, in response to decline in earnings, diversified firms retrench
quickly and increase their focus on core operations. Our result indicates that, on
balance, for the future viability of the firm excessive divesting may not be prudent.
This could be because bankrupt firms seeking liquidity often have to sell their
more profitable lines of businesses leaving the firm with plants that are less
productive ŽMaksimovic and Phillips, 1998., which contributes to a higher probability of repeated bankruptcy in the future.
The capacity utilization variable is significant with a positive sign. This
indicates that the higher the capacity utilization of the firm’s industry relative to
peak performance at the time of emergence, the greater is the probability of the
firm re-entering bankruptcy. Bandopadhyaya Ž1994. reports that it is easier for a
firm to reorganize if it is in a high-capacity utilization industry. The finding in our
paper suggests that the firms that took advantage of the favorable industry
conditions at the time of their emergence, without necessarily being healthy
enterprises in themselves, are more likely to encounter financial difficulties in the
future. Firms that emerge from Chapter 11 protection in spite of hostile industry
conditions are more likely to succeed in the future.
Interestingly, the change in the CEO of a firm has an insignificant impact on
the hazard. Arguments in the literature suggest that incumbent managers inefficiently continue a losing enterprise when it should have been liquidated ŽJensen,
1993; Hotchkiss, 1995.. This tendency of managers gives rise to the possibility
that firms that undergo reorganization with their original managers are more likely
to encounter further financial difficulties. The evidence in this paper suggests that
a management change or a lack thereof, does not influence the probability of the
firm re-entering bankruptcy. This result is consistent with findings in Hotchkiss
and Mooradian Ž1997., who argue that the dynamics of the bankruptcy process
have changed with the rise of AvultureB investors, who frequently take over the
management of the firms in which they have invested. Thus, for samples including
bankruptcies in the late 1980s and early 1990s management may not be insulated
from external discipline.
The demand growth variable has a positive effect on the hazard. This is
consistent with Maksimovic and Phillips’s Ž1998. finding that productivity of
bankrupt firms in relatively high demand growth industries is lower than their
industry counterparts. Thus, reorganized firms from high growth industries are at a
greater risk of a second bankruptcy filing since they are more likely to be industry
under-performers.
Finally, the total assets, and the GDP growth variables have an insignificant
effect on the hazard suggesting that firm size and the general economy wide
conditions do not play a significant role in determining the probability of future
financial difficulties. Although the literature suggests that larger firms have easier
access to financial markets, apparently that alone does not have a significant
influence on the firm’s ability to ward off future bankruptcy. Similarly, after

controlling for firms specific and industry characteristics, purely economy wide
conditions do not play a major role in determining if the firm will re-file for
bankruptcy.12
As mentioned in the methodology section, a log-logistic function implies a
hazard that declines for sufficiently long durations. The value of a determines the
location of the point after which the hazard function declines. In particular, if
a F 1, the hazard declines monotonically; and if a ) 1, the hazard attains a
maximum before it begins to decline. The estimated value of a is 1.734 for the
standard and 2.210 for the split model, which are both statistically greater than 1.
The plots of the estimated hazard, evaluated at the mean values of the variables,
for both models are presented in Fig. 3. Notice that the hazard of the split model
increases initially, reaching a peak at about 4 years, and declines sharply thereafter. In comparison, the decline of the hazard of the standard model is very
gentle. This result is not surprising since the standard model expects all firms to
re-enter bankruptcy and consequently predicts a high hazard even beyond 6 years.
The split model suggests a significant decline in the hazard after 4 years since it
appropriately takes into account that not all firms will eventually fail. This shape
of the estimated hazard for the split model is intuitively appealing. A firm that
reorganizes under Chapter 11 has a low instantaneous probability of failure shortly
after emergence. However, the firm remains vulnerable to another bankruptcy and
this vulnerability increases over time. If the firm is able to endure this increased
vulnerability up to a critical time period the probability of re-entering bankruptcy
sharply declines.
It should be noted that the hazard stays quite high Žabout 10% or more. even up
to 6 years after emergence, a finding that is consistent with the histogram in Fig.
2. In fact, the specification of the split model is justified since the estimated hazard
ŽFig. 3. emulates the actual frequency of bankruptcies ŽFig. 2. extremely well. It
seems that firms that are reorganized under Chapter 11 stay vulnerable for a
relatively long period of time. It can be argued that all firms, including the ones
that have never been reorganized, are at some risk of bankruptcy. In fact, after a
sufficiently long period of time, some of the effects of the first reorganization
wears off and the hazard of the reorganized firm converges to that of any firm.
However, the obvious time dependence shown in the early years after reorganization in the plotted hazard indicates that this hazard is associated only with firms
that have been reorganized.
In order to examine the influence of various explanatory variables on the hazard
more closely, we estimate the average hazard for firms with different values of the
variables. For each variable, we divide our sample into quartiles and compute the
average quartile value. In Table 3 we present the estimated hazard at year 4 at the
average quartiles with the remaining variables at their overall averages. This
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Results are robust to alternative measures of economic conditions, such as interest rates.

Fig. 3. The estimated hazard of the log-logistic and split-population log-logistic models.

enables us to highlight the magnitude of the influence of each variable on the
hazard. For instance, the hazard of an average firm in the first quartile of Change
in DebtrAssets is 0.095; this hazard is significantly higher Ž0.166. for firms that
are in the fourth quartile. The hazards of a firm in the first and fourth quartiles of
Duration 1 are 0.170 and 0.069, respectively. Similarly, the average hazard for
firms in the fourth quartile of the capacity utilization variable is more than two
times than that of firms in the first quartile.

Table 3
Average hazard at year 4 for different quartiles of the explanatory variables
Variables

Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

Duration 1
Log Assets
Change in DebtrAssets
Change in CEO
Change in aSIC
Capacity Utilization
Demand Growth
GDP Growth

0.170
0.160
0.095
0.121
0.170
0.070
0.110
0.116

0.157
0.142
0.123
0.121
0.114
0.127
0.123
0.129

0.123
0.125
0.138
0.144
0.114
0.154
0.137
0.140

0.069
0.102
0.166
0.144
0.087
0.168
0.158
0.146

Ø The hazard is computed from the estimated split-population log-logistic duration model.
Ø The hazard is estimated for different quartiles of a given variable with the remaining variables
evaluated at their means.

5. Conclusion
For the stakeholders of a firm it is important to know what the future prospects
of the firm are after a reorganization under Chapter 11. Would the firm re-file for
Chapter 11 or liquidate, and if so when, or would it continue to operate
successfully? In this paper we examine if a reorganized firm will eventually go
bankrupt and when for a vulnerable firm this will happen. Firms that emerge from
Chapter 11 protection are observed over time and their performance after emergence is recorded. We use a split-population duration model that controls for the
fact that some firms may never go bankrupt once they have emerged from Chapter
11. We find that the probability of an average firm eventually re-entering
bankruptcy is 73%.
It has been documented that the financial woes of a firm are not only due to
factors that are firm specific but also are linked to industry conditions. In a similar
vein, one could argue that a re-occurrence of bankruptcy could be due to actions
taken by the firm during re- organization or industry and economy-wide factors
could dictate it. We use both sets of factors to estimate the vulnerability of a firm
to another bankruptcy after it has been re- organized under Chapter 11. Of the firm
specific variables, we find that this vulnerability is lower for firms that have spent
a longer period of time under Chapter 11 protection, have lowered their leverage,
and have retained a larger number of lines of businesses. The industry conditions
also play a critical role in the re-occurrence of bankruptcy. We find that firms in
the highest quartile of industry capacity utilization are more than two times more
vulnerable than firms in the lowest quartile. Firms from high demand growth
industries are more likely to file for another bankruptcy.
The estimated hazard increases initially and then begins to decline after
approximately 4 years, implying that the instantaneous probability of a firm
re-entering bankruptcy continues to increase up to 4 years. Furthermore, we find
that this probability, although on the decline, remains high for almost 6 years after
emergence. This suggests that the financial woes of a reorganized firm persist for a
significant length of time. The vulnerability of a reorganized firm over a relatively
long period of time, and the influence of various aspects of reorganization and
industry conditions on this vulnerability has important implications for the creditors and the stockholders of the firm and also for policy makers who monitor the
bankruptcy process.
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